The distinction formulated by Jacques Maritain between “acting as a Christian” and “acting insofar as one is a Christian” is often interpreted as the opposition between a discreet expression of faith and its explicit affirmation in the public sphere. This article argues that such a reading is inadequate. Through an analysis of the appendix “Structure of Action” in Integral Humanism and the Letter on Independence, it shows that this distinction concerns an architecture of orders of action, articulating the spiritual and temporal planes. A dialogue with William Cavanaugh’s contemporary critique helps clarify its ecclesiological and political implications, and highlights its relevance for current reflections on Christian responsibility and pluralism.
Question and Context
The distinction made by Jacques Maritain between acting as a Christian and acting insofar as one is a Christian is frequently used to differentiate between ways of being in the world for a Christian. On the one hand, we have a discreet, intimate presence, where personal faith — though it may obviously influence my actions or political deliberations — remains a private matter. From this perspective, acting as is fundamentally presented as an action in which the reference to faith concerns only the individual. On the other hand, acting insofar as one is a Christian would denote a presence in the world where faith is expressed, explicit — even asserted. Faith would then serve as an overt justification for choice or action. This is easily understood: such a distinction between these two types, understood in this way,…